Responses to Comments on Huawei CV Paper

I make it a pretty strict rule to not read comments, positive or negative, about my work. I have some wonderful friends or virtual commentators that have asked insightful questions that deserve some response. Given the number of comments and vociferousness this paper has elicited, I have decided to respond to some of the comments.

  1. The paper is not an academic paper. No, and I never said it was. It was never intended or designed as a journal article type paper for many reasons. The purpose of the paper was to provide information into the public domain that did not exist before in a concise and readable form for everyone from politicians in different countries to citizens hearing about the issue. The focus was on describing the data the specific profiles. That is it. It is not a good academic paper because it was never intended to be one.
  2. It is not an exhaustive study only taking a small sample of the CVs. Yes, I know I actually said that in the paper. This shouldn’t come as any surprise. There are two data or study specific reasons this choice was made. First, as I stated in the paper (ßhint hint) the data is messy and not easily given to general statistical analysis. This is being addressed to benefit future papers but given the computing capabilities needed and technical issues involved, this is not a snap your fingers and things are ready. Second, to actually analyze a CV one by one is a very time intensive process for a study like this. Just as one example, we needed to confirm through as many channels as possible that a CV of interest actually belonged to an actual individual. We needed to cross check information to business unit or military unit for instance. This is one instance where statistics will help provide some top line information but a lot of this work to confirm information about individuals is incredibly time consuming. To do this for any significant mass of individuals absent a small army of research interns is just not feasible. We will be following up on this and expanding on this work.
  3. So why didn’t you take more time and do a more exhaustive study? Public policy considerations. In an ideal world, we would take 6-12 months and turn out an in depth and comprehensive study. The reality is that countries are making crucial decisions right now involving Huawei. The decision was made to proceed releasing this in the recognition that while the research would benefit from more time, the trade off of making this data available to country decision makers and the analysis outweighed the benefit of producing a more comprehensive study of the CVs. This data has been provided to some country governments already and will be provided to other countries looking to conduct their own analysis. While I am sympathetic to the academic argument, in this case, I fully stand by the decision to proceed to market faster and make no apologies.
  4. The data and profiles are not replicable so we do not know how accurate they are. This decision was made fully knowing some would complain. Here is the logic. First, China has actually killed spies at the work place according to news reports. While it is unlikely they would kill one of their own, severe punishment of some kind of talking so openly about effectively classified or secret material would not be unlikely. We made this decision out of an abundance of caution to the targets. Second, while the decision to anonymize data was taken quite a while ago, a recent dispute between journalists about anonymizing subjects in China pieces clinched it that no information would be made public about these targets. It is somewhat ironic that a week ago China watchers were complaining about subject data being made public are now complaining about data being anonymized. Third, as I stressed in the paper (ß hint hint) methods and data would be shared on a case by case by basis with trusted researchers. There is no intent to conceal or hide information from trusted people that guarantee to keep the data confidential. This data and research has been shared with trusted researchers, governments, and politicians of all variety. We are more than willing to answer questions privately.
  5. Lots of companies, telecommunication firms probably disproportionately, around the world hire ex-military so Huawei is no different and the analysis provides nothing new. This is inaccurate for an important reasons. There is a clear line drawn between let us say the random chance of association and the specific work of the individual. Assume a large company is recruiting at a job fair with other companies. We would expect through pure random chance that some of their 100 new hires would be ex-military. I do not allege this is a problem. In fact, this paper could have been written without this dataset. What we are alleging is that certain individuals covered in the paper and other individuals not profiled in the paper, went far beyond normal manufacturing, electronics, and or communications expertise for an employer. Rather, as I write in the paper (ß hint hint) I am alleging that certain individuals acted as intelligence assets for the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS) and the People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force based upon their own words describing the work they performed. I am not alleging that simply hiring ex-military makes an espionage organization. I am alleging that when an individual states on their resume that they are the MSS representative and engaged in behavior like information interception, that is work beyond normal corporate work but under the guise of the state. I have specific granular information of people effectively testifying to what they did and am doing nothing more than urge readers to consider the words of employees saying what they did.
  6. So what is the bigger issue about why this matters? Huawei lies. They have been caught lying so much all the time they should have no credibility. I have proven through Chinese corporate records that Huawei is not a private company, something Huawei has admitted in a conference call with press and for which Huawei produced a transcript. I have no shown not just that they have a close link with the PLA, but rather they have specific employees stating they are representatives of the state acting on behalf of the state while working for Huawei. Again, these are their words. The only thing I am trying to do is to put this information in the public domain.
  7. Huawei is no different as the US collects lots of data also. True and I sincerely hope there is greater focus in the US on greater legal restraints on the governments access to data, firms ability to share it, and how it is used. However, to equate US surveillance or Facebook data gathering with the level of intrusion and fear of reprisals faced from China reveals nothing more than towering ignorance.

We are already starting to plot out the next reports and reaching out to specific researchers with unique expertise to help us better analyze this data and put it in the public domain. There is a lot more to come.

Is China Exporting Authoritarianism and Is It a Threat?

One of the major misconceptions China doves have begun to gravitate to is that China is not a threat because it does not seek to export authoritarianism therefore the United States does not need to consider China and its foreign policy as threatening. This is totally and fundamentally wrong. Let’s examine how.

Is China exporting authoritarianism?

Unquestionably. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has an entire agency called the United Front dedicated to spreading Chinese influence and at the very least making populations around the world more receptive to Chinese authoritianism. However, they even go distinctly farther engaging in domestic politics in many different countries to get United Front candidates elected, censoring information, or funding candidate linked projects or priorities. You can be sure these are not democratic friendly policies.

If we look at another area like the Belt and Road Initiative, we very clearly see that funding is overwhelmingly going to corrupt authoritarians helping to prop them up or aid democratic strongmen. Whether it is Pakistan which all of a sudden cannot find Muslim filled Xinjiang on a map or the support China is giving to authoritarian’s around the world, it is perfectly clear that BRI loans are channeled overwhelmingly to strengthening authoritarians. To take a related project, Huawei has been adopted vastly more in authoritarian leaning governments than in democratic states.

Then look to even international organizations like the United Nations. Beijing has pushed to the UN and related agencies to endorse Xi thought on governance and look the other way on their internment of Uyghurs in Xinjiang. It is not just specific countries but the entirety of the international organization that Beijing wants to remake in its authoritarian image.

Finally, draw up a list of Chinese allies and countries they are building significantly closer ties with and they are overwhelmingly authoritarian or authoritarian leaning. Let’s start with the DPRK (China is their closest ally so don’t argue) to Syria, Iran, and Russia. From there we can build out to many countries in emerging Asia like Cambodia to many in Africa. To deny China is not actively promoting the growth or authoritarianism is simply to deny the obvious empirical facts.

Is China a threat?

To properly answer this question, we must define what we mean by threat. If by threat we mean will they attempt a naval and land invasion of the west coast to conquer the United States? Unlikely. Does their system of government, external influence, and resource allocation seek to harm and pose a threat to the values and interests of America and free democratic countries around the world? Absolutely. No questions asked.

Whether it is militarizing the South China Sea, assistance and cooperation with countries like Russia, North Korea, Iran, Syria, Venezuela and others across a range of sectors from military to becoming quasi dependent states financially, China represents a clear and present threat internationally to liberal democratic values and states.

Additionally, China clearly sees itself as a revisionist state within the international order and the values that should be embedded within global organizations and institutions. While recent US policy could range benign to malign neglect, China has a much more fundamental conflict with these organizations to remake them more representative in mechanism and viewpoint of the CCP’s values and interests. Even before the Trump administration, China had made major strides in pushing international organizations and institutions to become increasingly compliant to their views using a variety of methods.

Furthermore, the entire world view and system of governance of the CCP is a repugnant anathema to freedom loving democracies anywhere in the world. The regressive state of Chinese politics, absence of any sense of human rights, total lack of an independent rule of law and or judiciary, and entirely closed propagandistic media and free speech environment. These are not some theoretical state of the world but the well known state of the world in China right now.

One of the most puzzling facts is why so many smart people refuse to accept and recognize the clear threat that China represents across a range of areas. I think there are numerous explanations that probably play a role. First, China has changed dramatically this decade and enormously from a decade or two and not necessarily in a good way despite the obvious economic advancement. 2019 China is an oppressive tyrannical authoritarian government that has regressed to cult of personality propagandistic narratives that almost gleefully imprisons millions based upon religion and backwards thinking. For most that seek to foster economic cooperation, they are willfully overlooking the reality of modern China.

Second, due partially to the Trump effect, many have sought to portray the breach as some type of a relationship issue that can be solved by improved communication or less rhetorical Tweeting by the President. The challenge of China is not a mere lovers spat or quarrel but the blindness of an abusive relationship that one party cannot bring themselves to leave. Trained to think not in absolute fundamentals but in feelings and view points, almost no one in the western world of governments or policy influence stands ready to label the China challenge as fundamental threat to the liberal belief system of respect for the individual, human rights, democracy and openness. There is a reticence to declare a system of values, that of liberal democracy, openness, and human rights, superior to another set of beliefs in the authoritarian CCP. If one cannot label China a fundamental violator opposed to all those values, one should not state they believe those things. If not now, when?

Third, there are numerous conflating or even spurious factors at play that confuse the issue. For instance, China’s rise has brought forth the widely cited Thucydides Trap theory of conflict. While we cannot compare in a vacuum, it is fair to assume that there would be not insignificant tension with the rise of China even if they were a liberal democracy. However, that fundamentally changes the relationship because both parties agree on the desired outcomes, rules of the game, and method of solving disputes. This is generally why democracies have not fought wars. The rules of the game, objectives and methods are similar. Consequently, while these and other theories draw the eye, they seek to avoid the most fundamental dispute of all between democratic openness and respect versus the all encompassing statist authoritarianism of the CCP. This is at its heart a fundamental dispute.

It is also worth noting that China’s size makes it a much more fundamental threat than other authoritarian states. It has much greater ability to influence states, organizations, firms, and people and it makes wide use of those tools. Furthermore, projecting outwards, this makes challenging China’s rise now more important before it gains a greater ability to direct and influence resources and firms. While not by itself a threat, its size plays into the threat.

So what propagates this misbegotten idea that China is not exporting authoritarianism or a threat?

I believe fundamentally the disconnect comes from focusing excessively on the historical channels of support diffusion by communist and democratic states. For instance, though the CCP talks openly about wanting to spread the Chinese governance model to other countries (something people who deny the obvious consistently choose to overlook), the bulk of the work exporting Chinese support for authoritarianism is conducted through striking different channels than the Soviet Union.

When China talks about or acts upon its push of authoritarianism, for the most part, it does not use communist or Marxist jargon and appeals to the workers or people. It uses much different channels and means to push CCP preferred policies. Consequently, many people who compare 2019 China to USSR workers power rhetoric examine current events and see nothing that resembles the exporting of global proletariat revolution. All this means however is that Beijing is not using those means.

China is using very different methods and channels to achieve a preferred outcome. As Mao might say, it does not matter if it is communist or authoritarian as long as it let’s us do what we want. Realizing communist chatter may not be as effective, Beijing has focused on other channels to help spread authoritarianism. One method is to target influencers from target countries or as I call it the Kardashian Model of exporting authoritarianism. In the United States for instance, three major think tanks have taken significant CCP linked money and uncoincidentally they do not see China as a serious threat in their writings even advising Beijing, appearing on state media regularly, or having their work cited by Chinese government agencies. In established democratic countries, this pattern repeats itself as CCP and linked companies have hired prolifically everyone from ex-politicians to technocrats pushing them to exert influence where possible. In less democratic countries or authoritarian states, in almost every BRI country there are flagrant examples of vast corruption linked to Chinese companies that never the less help promote authoritarians.

This presents a very different model for spreading authoritarianism and CCP influence. Gone are the appeals to global Marxism and formal anti-NATO security alliances from the Cold War. In are global financial flows to prop up authoritarian countries or leaning that way that do not have to turn over power to whatever unknown may come next that can be counted on to vote however Beijing wants when the UN votes on incorporating Xi language or pretending to not know about Xinjiang.

There are a wealth of other channels Beijing is using to export authoritarianism but that would turn into a lengthy paper. Just because Beijing is not using the Soviet model for exporting ideology does not mean it isn’t happening. Just as technology has unleased vast new tools that make authoritarianism much more efficient, the same can be said of technology exports. Offering people money to do what you want is much more effective than appealing to a shared sense of global justice under the auspices of Marxism.

Why does this matter looking at China as a risk?

It fundamentally informs us about how to rise to confront China. What people on both sides fail to grasp about how best to challenge China, Trump may not be an alliance builder but it has no material short term impact on the probability of reaching an acceptable outcome. As I’ve said before, China will not look at Trump agreeing with Macron that China is a significant problem and reverse course. However, most people that believe alliances matter also simultaneously hold the conflictual view that China is not exporting authoritarianism nor does it present a global threat. If China is not any of those things, than the need to build up allies is not needed. It is self contradictory. The problem is that most people use this phrase “I would work with allies as President” with no thought as to what that means simply because Trump is so bad at working with allies on even basic and obvious issues. They use the terminology not with strategic intent but to contrast Trump.

Viewing China as the global, multi-channel, influencing, authoritarianism exporting threat that it is, lays out how the United States needs to respond. First, China presents a global authoritarian exporting risk to the United States and other democracies and requires a large response. If it is not viewed as the fundamental threat it is, then you do need to respond or work with allies. If you do not view it as such it need not be treated as such. We must recognize the totality of the Chinese threat.

Second, the United States needs to significantly increase public funding of foreign activities. (I will do a separate blog post on this within the next week bringing more detail to this question). I want to stress that this primarily refers to non-military spending covering everything from the State Department and public diplomacy to development aid and other forms of investment. There is a decade long stagnation of foreign policy and resource allocation timed with China’s ascent. You cannot have serious discussion about American influence abroad on the cheap.

Third, America must be prepared to confront allies about the threat of China. Whether it is terminating intelligence sharing with the United Kingdom over Huawei or similar activities, even if it is not Trump, the refusal to address long term problems with regards to China has made it a much more problematic issue to address and will take much longer with higher cost. Even if Trump is not re-elected there is entirely too much fantasy that allies will somehow fall into line or not want to continue free riding. Just saying “reach out to allies” does not actually say anything about what you want to achieve, what is the probability they want to work with you, or see the same threat but it makes for a nice sound bite. Do not expect this to be the panacea most are painting. The United States for years under Republican and Democrat with many methods has urged Germany to assume greater responsibility for defending militarily and through other methods, democracy and freedom. Today, Germany remains large silent on Xinjiang concentration camps and continues to cut military expenditure while working more closely with Russia and China. The United States must be prepared to take harder stances not just with adversarial states but allies who prefer the seductive temptation of updated oppressive authoritarianism.

Fourth, America needs an entire rethink of how to challenge China. As I have detailed here and elsewhere, it is clear that there is no clear thinking of this. Declaring an intent to work with allies is not an actual strategy and what would be obtained, but rather a declaration that one is different than Trump. How should public resources potentially be utilized differently? Markets have worked far and away the best, but given many of the markets being targeted by China now are emerging and or frontier markets, should the United States and or others step into to help investors manage risks that markets cannot? Given the non-traditional warfare that China is effectively engaging in to influence the United States and other in different ways, how should the United States respond? Given the importance of advanced societies on information, should information like financial flows to Facebook be considered national security assets and or how should we manage our own society differently?

Even though I continue to hear how the United States has a bipartisan concern about China, there is no systematic rethinking of the totality of the threat posed by China and how the United States should respond. As I covered in a previous post, we must think about the costs we are laying out, both positive and negative, and then given the emergent threat, how should we respond?