The short answer: absolutely not.
There is a profound inability to think rationally about policy pervading the Acela Corridor so that every decision means the end of democracy or some other vast rhetorical flourish implying rampaging Godzilla. The latest is the intellectually vacuous think tank crowd of DC debating such profound questions of whether US foreign policy can be repaired or how radical a departure Trump foreign policy represents. The absolute reality is that focused strictly on policy, leaving aside Tweets, Trump foreign policy is well within the historical boundaries of traditional US foreign policy.
Before I lay out the case for this, I want to define and limit some of what I mean or am going to do. First, I am not going to use Trump rhetorical flourishes whether in reported conversations, Tweets, or live mic. We are going to focus on the policies that are being carried out by the US government. Second, I am going to strictly limit (as much as I can) any judgement on whether the actions are right or wrong, but rather where there is policy continuity or breaks between the Trump administration and the Obama administration and even where possible previous administrations. Third, we are going to judge an action by whether it was either previously used by the US government or advocated by mainstream individuals or institutions from either party. The goal is here is not to determine a policies rightness or wrongness but whether this carries forward or breaks with existing policy and whether that break or continuity is considered a mainstream policy. Make sure to understand the limits and parameters of what we are setting out to do here. Finally, we won’t be able to hit every issue so I apologize in advance.
Russia: This one gets a lot of focus for obvious reasons (which I am going to mostly avoid) but the reality is one reviews the list of policy initiatives towards Russia, what we basically see is policy continuity between the Obama and Trump administrations. Trump administration policies on sanctions and other areas have been pretty consistently in line with the continued policy pressures escalating used by the Obama administration and have largely used similar tools and in similar magnitudes. Based strictly on the policy record, there is little evidence of any real break with recent Obama administration in the few years prior to Trump election. Furthermore, this is largely a return to more hawkish Russian policy of previous administrations and the later part of the Obama administration after the early Russian reset. While some may argue the Trump administration should be harder or that the public signaling has been problematic, both have some merit, the Trump administration is clearly in line with historical US and the last couple years of Obama policy.
Saudi Arabia: The Trump administration has received a lot of criticism for their Saudi policy, primarily due to their bone sawing of a prominent critic and Washington Post columnist. In reality again, their Saudi policy is clearly in line with historical US policy towards Saudi Arabia. Let me strongly emphasize this is no defense of Saudi Arabia or bone sawing critics. It is however the clear headed recognition of the history of US, and yes Obama administration, foreign policy alignment towards Saudi Arabia. While Obama may have expressed some unease about Saudi Arabia, he was a full fledged supporter of their war in Yemen (which we will get to in a minute in another case) and defended them regularly in different areas. This is not a critique of Obama as he was very much within the mainstream of how US foreign policy has treated Saudi Arabia over time, but it points to the intellectual bankruptcy of critics of Trump Saudi policy. Trump policy on Saudi Arabia is actually rather continuous of Obama and historical US foreign policy towards Saudi Arabia.
Europe: From NATO to trade to individual countries many have seen the actions of the Trump administration towards Europe as unprecedented and attacks on allies. In reality, I would argue it is, to use a simple distinction, neither broadly contiguous nor a full break but rather an escalation or expansion of previously existing thought and policies of previous administrations. Many of Trump policies on NATO and Germany, to take two simple examples, build upon existing policies and signaling of previous administrations from both parties dating back to the first Bush administration. The Obama administration (not blaming) removed US troops from Germany just as the Trump administration has done. Also forgotten are the relational difficulties the Obama administration had with key European leaders such as when Angela Merkel found out US intelligence had hacked her phone. This is not to blame Obama as this behavior likely would have occurred regardless but caused significant relational difficulties and has definitely tainted US German relations to this day specifically in light of the Huawei decision. It may be entirely fair to debate the delivery of policy expansions or key decisions, the timing in light of other events, but just as with other policy domains, what we see is mostly continuity with some definite expansion of policy thinking.
Iran: This is a rather unique case. Trump most definitely broke with Obama policy on Iran but, and this is very important, Obama policy was a significant break with historical US policy. Quite arguably, the Trump administration is merely returning US Iranian policy towards a historical norm. Importantly, neither Obama nor Trump should be considered outside the mainstream for either decision. It is not the intention of this exercise to litigate Obama or Trump’s decision but I will briefly note my personal opinion is that Obama set too low a bar to reach a deal which was likely to result in significant problems and the Trump administration likely set too low a bar in ending the deal. However, it is rather clear at this point that Iran was cheating on the deal barely after the ink was dry if they ever stopped violating it at all. What makes the Iran matter rather unique is its centrality to pretty much every problem in the Middle East from Yemen to Syria. This is a case where yes, the Trump administration clearly broke with the Obama administration but it was really Obama who moved the US away from historical US policy. Nor is Trump policy on Iran in anyway outside mainstream or remotely radical thinking on Iran.
Human rights and democracy: The issues are not as neatly linear as they are with a specific country policy, but the policy comparisons between Obama and Trump are interesting here. In global human rights, Obama’s record is at spotty at best. From Yemen to democracy protests in the Middle to Syria, the Obama record is weak at best. The Obama administration was decidedly better at rhetoric than the Trump administration but as a matter of policy, the Obama administration has significant problems. Leaving aside the rhetoric, the Trump administration record has been spotty but as a matter of policy no worse than the Obama administration and likely better. From Taiwan to Xinjiang and Hong Kong, the Trump administration has implemented a slew of policies to address these issues. However, there have been other areas where the Trump administration has been decidedly weaker. The Trump administration, just like the Obama administration, has largely chosen to stay out of Syria and continuing to follow Obama or general US historic policies in the Middle East. On democracy, Trump has strongly supported Hong Kong and Taiwan, however, has spoken minimally about Belarus and come under fire for not doing more on Venezuela. One can fault both Presidents for choosing to prioritize some democratic changes in foreign countries and not others but there is little to believe the Trump administration represents any clear break on from Obama or historical US policy. Fundamentally, both the Trump administration and the Obama, as well as previous administrations, pursued limited human rights agendas using sanctions or financial penalties as the primary channel with clear mistakes. One can fault Trump or Obama but it is difficult to see how anything in the Trump administration represents a clear break fundamentally or philosophically with historical policy. It may focus on different areas or utilize different calculus, but there is little to indicate a move outside historical policy trends.
International organizations: The record here could generally be classified as somewhat in line but expanding on previous thinking within the USG and mainline thinking somewhat similar to how I classified Europe. The Obama administration and historically true of recent administrations, say post Reagan, have demonstrated a growing ambivalence and wariness about many international institutions. They may do so for different reasons, but both political parties have grown increasingly distrustful of major international institutions. To take one example, despite the criticism of the Trump administration over WHO, Dr. Tedros was elected under the Obama administration as the preferred candidate of China. Now to the Obama administrations credit, they worked hard against Dr. Tedros seeing him as problematic. However, whether it is the WHO, WTO, UN Human Rights Council, many international institutions have fallen under increasing criticism from individuals of both parties and Democratic and Republic administrations have reasons to be very concerned about the failures and unreformability of these institutions. Trump can be considered an extension of historical policies in that many Republicans for a long time have complained, for a variety of reasons, about these institutions and Democrats have increasingly acknowledged their weaknesses even if preferring to try to continue to work with them.
China: The change in China policy might be classified just beneath the complete break I classify Iran as but distinctly beyond any mere policy extension. The Obama administration executed a broadly weak policy on China doing very little. They engaged regularly but have almost no tangible results that can be pointed to. They were entirely too trusting of China and rarely pushed back against China. The only reason I do not call this a complete break is some of the basics were there though little was done on them. US policy on companies like Huawei and ZTE has been long standing and bipartisan in both the Executive and Legislative branches. Though the Obama administration was entirely too trusting of Chinese promises over the South China Sea and did little when China revealed its building plans, they at least conducted occasional Freedom of Navigation operations though they were very restrictive. The Trump administration has expanded policy efforts in both of these areas. More broadly however, Trump policy is a clear break. From working to enforce laws pertaining to university transfer of data and foreign donations to increasing counter intelligence efforts imposing sanctions, there has been a very clear break with both historical and Obama China policy. One final area of note is tariffs. Obama actually imposed numerous tariffs on Chinese firms for things like dumping. Trump has significantly expanded on this policy but even this would not be considered the clear distinct break many consider it. Fundamentally, nor does anything Trump is doing represent radical breaks from pretty main stream thinking or policy issues that people can argue over. The Joe Biden campaign policy, not saying it would be true if he is elected, is that Trump has not been HARD enough on China. In fact Biden policy is as one person described it, Trump on steroids. Other criticisms are that there is no grand strategy behind it. This is not a criticism that the policy represents a break or departure from mainstream thinking or historical policy trends rather that the ideas are not knit together in a strategic manner.
There are many valid debates, as there are with any administration, about policy outcomes, inputs, and strategies. I think there are valid debates about China, international organizations, timing, and issues like the public communications strategies. I would not have left TPP and while I generally agree on troop draw downs in Germany, the timing and roll out are very debatable.
However, Trump foreign policy, again focusing on the policy, is for the most part a continuation and expansion of existing US foreign policy thinking or policies. In most areas it is right in line with historical policy or expanding on previous initiatives or thinking that was mainstream in both parties. There are policy differences between the two administration but policy differences are not major breaks with historical US or Obama foreign policy. In fact, we only see two real areas where there are major breaks of policy and that is Iran and China. Importantly, and again not relitigating the decision, rightly or wrongly Trump is returning Iran policy to its more historical norm rather than deviating from the norm. China is much more of a break with both history and Obama. One can validly debate these policy decisions but it is completely false to argue that these policies are in some way far outside the mainstream or over turning historical policy.
https://www.politico.com/story/2016/09/obama-saudi-arabia-228521
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/07/barack-obama-world-popularity-cuba-egypt-ukraine-bbc-documentary-214032
https://www.foxnews.com/politics/obama-administration-criticizes-u-n-human-rights-council-but-still-wants-to-keep-its-seat